Abstract
Introduction
Database security concerns the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored in a database. A broad span of research from authorization [9, 28, 14] , to inference control [1] , to multilevel secure databases [33, 31] , and to multilevel secure transaction processing [3] , addresses primarily how to protect the security of a database, especially its confidentiality. However, very limited research has been done on how to survive successful database attacks, which can seriously impair the integrity and availability of a database. Experience with data-intensive applications such as credit card billing, banking, air traffic control, logistics management, inventory tracking, and online stock trading, has shown that a variety of attacks do succeed to fool traditional database protection mechanisms. In fact, we must recognize that not all attacks -even obvious ones -can be averted at their outset. Attacks that succeed, to some degree at least, are unavoidable. With cyber attacks on data-intensive internet applications, i.e., e-commerce systems, becoming an ever more serious threat to our economy, society, and everyday lives, attack resistant database systems that can survive malicious attacks are a significant concern.
One critical step towards attack resistant database systems is intrusion detection, which has attracted many researchers [7, 21, 13, 10, 23, 26, 22, 17, 18] . Intrusion detection systems monitor system or network activity to discover attempts to disrupt or gain illicit access to systems. The methodology of intrusion detection can be roughly classed as being either based on statistical profiles [15, 16, 30] or on known patterns of attacks, called signatures [11, 8, 27, 12, 32] . Intrusion detection can supplement protection of network and information systems by rejecting the future access of detected attackers and by providing useful hints on how to strengthen the defense. However, intrusion detection has several inherent limitations: (a) Intrusion detection makes the system attack-aware but not attack-resistant, that is, intrusion detection itself cannot maintain the integrity and availability of the database in face of attacks. (b) Achieving accurate detection is usually difficult or expensive. The false alarm rate is high in many cases. (c) The average detection latency in many cases is too long to effectively confine the damage.
To overcome the limitations of intrusion detection, a broader perspective is introduced, saying that in addition to detecting attacks, countermeasures to these successful attacks should be planned and deployed in advance. In the literature, this is referred to as survivability or intrusion tolerance. In this paper, we will address an useful technique for database intrusion tolerance, namely attack isolation, and present the design of a practical system which can do attack isolation.
The Problem
The merit of attack isolation can only be clearly explained in the context of an intrusion tolerant database sys-tem. Database intrusion tolerance can mainly be enforced at two possible levels: operating system (OS) level and transaction level. Although transaction level methods cannot handle OS level attacks, it is shown that in many applications where attacks are enforced mainly through malicious transactions transaction level methods can tolerate intrusions in a much more effective and efficient way. Moreover, it is shown that OS level intrusion tolerance techniques such as those proposed in [23, 22, 24, 25, 4] , can be directly integrated into a transaction level intrusion tolerance framework to complement it with the ability to tolerate OS level attacks. This paper will focus on transaction level intrusion tolerance, and our presentation will be based on the intrusion tolerant database system architecture shown in Figure  1 .
The architecture is built on top of a traditional COTS (Commercial-Of-The-Shelf) DBMS. Within the framework, the Intrusion Detector identifies malicious transactions based on the history kept (mainly) in the log. The Damage Assessor locates the damage caused by the detected transactions. The Damage Repairer repairs the located damage using some specific cleaning transactions. The Damage Confinement Manager restricts the access to the objects that have been identified by the Damage Assessor as damaged, and unconfines an object after it is cleaned. The Policy Enforcement Manager (PEM) (a) functions as a proxy for normal user transactions and those cleaning transactions, and (b) is responsible for enforcing system-wide intrusion tolerant policies. For example, a policy may require the PEM to reject every new transaction submitted by an user as soon as the Intrusion Detector finds that a malicious transaction is submitted by the user. It should be noticed that the framework is designed to do all the intrusion tolerance work on-the-fly without the need to periodically halt normal transaction processing.
The complexity of the framework is mainly caused by a phenomenon denoted damage spreading. In a database, the results of one transaction can affect the execution of some other transactions. Informally, when a transaction Ì reads an object Ü updated by another transaction Ì , Ì is directly affected by Ì . If a third transaction Ì is affected by Ì , but not directly affected by Ì , Ì is indirectly affected by Ì . It is easy to see that when a (relatively old) transaction that updates Ü is identified malicious, the damage on Ü can spread to every object updated by a transaction that is affected by , directly or indirectly. The job of the Damage Assessor and the Damage Repairer is to locate each affected transaction and recover the database from the damage caused on the objects updated by the transaction. In particular, when an affected transaction is located, the Damage Repairer builds a specific cleaning transaction to clean each object updated by the transaction (and not cleaned yet). Cleaning an object is simply done by restoring the value of the object to its latest undamaged version. This job gets even more difficult as the execution of new transactions continues because the damage can spread to new transactions and cleaned objects can be re-damaged by new transactions. Therefore, the main objective of this framework is to guarantee that damage spreading is (dynamically) controlled in such a way that the database will not be damaged to a degree that is unacceptable or useless. The limitation of this architecture is mainly due to the fact that the effectiveness of the framework is heavily dependent on the performance of the Intrusion Detector (For example, the framework cannot handle the malicious transactions not captured by the Intrusion Detector), and the fact that for accuracy a (relatively) long detection latency is usually caused, especially when anomaly detection is enforced. One main reason for the latency is that intrusion detection has to make a tradeoff between meeting the requirement of reporting an intrusion accurately (i.e., low false alarm rates) and the requirement of detecting as many intrusions as possible (i.e., high detection rates), which can often result in conflicting design goals. For example, in anomaly detection, for detection accuracy the anomaly threshold for reporting must be high, thus many intrusions with gradual anomaly cannot be identified; on the other hand, in order to capture more intrusions, the threshold should instead be lower, thus the false alarm rate would increase and many legitimate transactions can be mistaken for malicious and suffer denial-of-service. To resolve this dilemma, extending the monitoring time window is one feasible solution. By collecting and investigating more proofs about a suspicious activity, usually more accuracy can be achieved. For example, [20] shows that when using system call trails to identify sendmail attacks, synthesizing the anomaly scores of a sequence of system calls (longer than 6) can achieve much better accuracy than based on single system calls. Moreover, in many real world examples, i.e., fraud credit card usage detection, human intervention is needed, which can make the detection latency even longer.
Significant detection latency can cause serious damage spreading in many cases. As a result, the main objective of this framework can be seriously jeopardized. Therefore, how to overcome this limitation is a critical issue.
Our Approach and Contribution
In [19] , isolation is proposed as an effective approach to solve the above problem, and a general algorithm to do isolation in the context of database systems is presented.
In this approach, when a suspicious user Ë is discovered, although more investigation is still needed for accurate detection, Ë's access will be isolated transparently into a separate environment that still appears to Ë to be the actual system. In this way, Ë's activities are allowed to be kept under (possibly more careful) surveillance without risking further harm to the system. Compared with fishbowling, a general technique for isolation, this approach isolates attacks without consuming duplicate resources to construct an entirely separate environment, allows options for partial interaction across the isolation boundary, and provides algorithms for smoothly merging Ë's work back into the real system should Ë prove innocent. This paper presents the design of a real-time data attack isolation system, denoted DAIS. DAIS is a COTS-DBMSspecific implementation of the general isolation algorithm, which is based on an abstract database model. In particular, the design of the first DAIS prototype, which is for Oracle Server 8.1.6, is discussed. DAIS uses triggers and transaction profiles to keep track of the items read and written by transactions, isolates attacks by rewriting user SQL statements, and is transparent to end users. The DAIS design is very general. In addition to Oracle, it can be easily adapted to support many other database application platforms such as Microsoft SQL Server, Sybase, and Informix.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the general isolation algorithm. In Section 3, we present the design of DAIS. We address some performance issues in Section 4. In Section 5, we conclude the paper. [19] views a database is a collection of data items (or objects). The database state is determined by the values of these data items. Data items are operated by transactions. A transaction is a partial order of read and write operations that either commits or aborts. Two operations conflict if one is write. The execution of a set of transactions is modeled by a history, which is a partial order ( È À ), where È is the set of all operations executed by these transactions, and À indicates the execution order of those operations. Two histories are equivalent if (1) they are defined over the same set of transactions and have the same operations, and (2) they order conflicting operations of nonaborted transactions in the same way. A history À is serial if, for any two transactions Ì and Ì that appear in À, either all operations of Ì appear before those of Ì or vice versa. A history À is serializable if its committed projection is equivalent to a serial history [5] . [19] assumes that every history is serializable, and (for simplicity) that the read set of a transaction always contains its write set.
The General Isolation Algorithm

The Model
In the model, isolation is enforced in terms of users, when an user is identified suspicious, every transaction executed by the user is simply marked suspicious. A straightforward way is using a separate database, which contains a copy of every item in the real database, to isolate each suspicious user. When an user is isolated, every transaction of the user will be executed within the isolated database built for the user. As a result, at time Ø, if there are Ò suspicious users, then there are Ò · ½ databases, a real database for all trustworthy users and an isolated database for each suspicious user. However, the naive approach has two limitations: (1) for a large database many items may never be read or updated by a suspicious user, and maintaining these items in isolated databases is a waste of resources; (2) new updates by trustworthy transactions after a suspicious user is isolated are not visible to the isolated user.
To overcome these two limitations, [19] uses data versions to give the illusion of isolated databases, and allows isolated users to read new updates of trustworthy users if needed. In particular, a data item Ü has one trustworthy version and may have multiple suspicious versions. One and only one suspicious version of Ü is produced for each suspicious user that has updated Ü. If Ü has never been updated by a suspicious user, it has no suspicious versions. So the number of suspicious versions is usually much smaller than the number of trustworthy versions. The suspicious versions maintained for a suspicious user Ë , together with the trustworthy versions of the items that do not have a suspicious version for Ë , comprise the virtual isolated database for Ë .
Isolation is achieved by controlling the access of transactions to versions. In particular, in the algorithm one-way isolation strategy is used, where (a) trustworthy transactions can only read and update trustworthy versions, and (b) suspicious transactions can read but not update trustworthy versions. In particular, transactions of a suspicious user Ë can only update the suspicious versions produced for Ë , and when a transaction of Ë wants to read a data item Ü, if a suspicious version of Ü has not been produced for Ë , then the trustworthy version of Ü is read. Otherwise, the suspicious version is read. Note that in addition to one-way isolation other isolation strategies may also be useful. For example, in some cases, some updates of suspicious users may be able to be disclosed to trustworthy users.
The Algorithm
The algorithm has three parts: a version control algorithm that controls the access of suspicious users to versions, a conflict identification and resolution algorithm that identifies and resolves the inconsistency between the real database and an isolated database when the corresponding (isolated) user is proved innocent, and a merging algorithm that merges the updates of an isolated user back into the real database. Note that here multiple suspicious users could be simultaneously isolated. Note also that when the updates of an isolated user are to be merged back into the real database, the updates of another isolated user may have already been merged back into the real database.
Part I: Version Control Algorithm
Before a database system starts to run transactions, each data item Ü has only one version which is associated with the same version number MAIN, denoted -Otherwise, the Ø version must exist, and it is given.
When a transaction submitted by a suspicious user Ë wants to read Ü, if there is a Ø version of Ü, then the Ø version is given. Otherwise, the MAIN version is given.
When an isolated user is proved malicious, all the suspicious versions maintained for the user are discarded and the real database is not harmed. When an isolated user is proved innocent, we need to merge the updates of the user back into the real database. Since a data item can be independently updated by both a trustworthy transaction and a suspicious transaction, the real database and the isolated database can be inconsistent. The conflict identification and resolution algorithm, which is specified as follows, uses a specific graph, denoted precedence graph, to identify and resolve the inconsistencies. [19] shows that if the precedence graph is acyclic, then the real database and the isolated database are consistent. We add read edges to the traditional precedence graph to support one-way isolation.
-Let Ì be a trustworthy transaction that reads a data item that has been updated by a suspicious transaction Ì × , and there is no path from Ì to Ì × , then there is a directed edge Ì Ì × . -Let Ì × be a suspicious transaction that reads a data item that has been updated by a trustworthy transaction Ì , and there is no path from Ì and Ì × that includes a read edge, then there is a directed edge Ì × Ì .
If ´À Ñ À × µ is acyclic, then the algorithm ends. If ´À Ñ À × µ has cycles, then first break all the cycle by backing out some transactions, then end the algorithm.
Although it is shown in [6] that just finding the optimal back out strategy is NP-complete, the simulation results of [6] show that in many cases, several back out strategies, in particular breaking two-cycles optimally, can achieve good performance.
For each transaction Ì that is backed out from À Ñ , locate every active suspicious history which has a read edge from Ì , and for each such read edge, denoted Ì Ì × , back out Ì × and every transaction that is affected by Ì × .
After the inconsistency between the real database and the isolated database is resolved, we can use the following algorithm to merge the (left) updates of the isolated user back into the database. [19] shows that given À and À × , the precedence graph ´À Ñ À × µ is acyclic if and only if there is an equivalent merged serializable history À that can generate the same database state as generated by the merging algorithm.
Part III: Merging Algorithm
For every data item that has a suspicious version maintained for the isolated user, replace its trustworthy version (value) with its suspicious version (value), and then remove the suspicious version. 
An Example
We illustrate the algorithm by an example.
Example 1 Consider the five transactions given below:
Assume that the real database history is À = Ì ½ Ì ¾ Ì ¿ and the suspicious history is À × = Ì ×½ Ì ×¾ Ì ×¿ . Assume the commit time order is Ì ×½ Ì ½ Ì ×¾ Ì ¾ Ì ×¿ Ì ¿ .
It is clear the first version for the isolated user is created when Ì ×½ updates . Ì ×¾ will read the updates of Ì ½ on ½ and ¿ , and read the update of Ì ×½ on . After Ì ×¾ is executed there are three suspicious versions for the isolated user, namely, ¾ , ¿ , and . However, Ì ¿ cannot read the update of Ì ×¾ on ¾ according to the one-way isolation strategy. After Ì ×¿ is executed there is one more suspicious version (for ). Since every item has a trustworthy version, any corruption on these suspicious versions will not harm the real database. If the isolated user is proved innocent, the precedence graph ´À À × µ shown in Figure 2 can be used to identify and resolve the conflicts between À and À × . Since the graph has a cycle, conflicts exist among the transactions. 
DAIS
The major components of DAIS are shown in Figure  3 . In general, the Intrusion Detector informs DAIS which users are suspicious and should be isolated. The Mediator, which has three components, proxies every user transaction and SQL statement (or command). The triggers, the SQL Statement Logger, and the Read Extractor are responsible for keeping track of the read and write operations of transactions, which are necessary to build the precedence graph when a merging should be done. The SQL Statement Rewriter and Redirector (SRR) is responsible for enforcing the Version Control Algorithm. The Read Edge Manager helps to maintain read edges. The Merger is responsible for enforcing Conflict Identification and Resolution Algorithm and the Merging Algorithm. The On-the-fly Isolation Controller enables new user transactions to continue executing without jeopardizing the correctness of merging processes.
Intrusion Detector
The Intrusion Detector informs DAIS which users should be isolated. The Intrusion Detector does anomaly detection in terms of each transaction and each user. For each transaction of a user, the Intrusion Detector will generate an anomaly degree (based on the transaction's behavior), which indicates how abnormal (or suspicious) the transaction is. Then the anomaly degrees of the transactions submitted by the user (within a session) will be synthesized to generate the anomaly degree of the user. If the anomaly de-gree is above a specific threshold, the user will be reported to the SRR as suspicious. The threshold is adaptively determined by the SSO and the Intrusion Detector based on the probability that a suspicious transaction turns out to be malicious, which can be indicated, to some extent, by the detection history. Readers can refer to [29] for more details about this detector.
Triggers
Oracle Redo logs record every write operation, however, unfortunately its structure is confidential, so getting information about writes from Oracle Redo logs is very difficult. This is also why we use triggers to keep track of writes.
Triggers can capture the write operations associated with a Update, Delete, or Insert statement. We use triggers to keep track of the writes of both trustworthy and suspicious transactions. To illustrate, consider a simple banking database that has two tables: the the Account table that keeps the current balance of each customer account, and the Money Transaction Note that Oracle uses a unique seven digit Transaction ID to identify each (database) transaction. Note also that here for simplicity we log writes at record level where each data item represents a record. Logging writes at field level can achieve finer isolation control, however, it causes more resources.
SQL Statement Logger
Although triggers can capture every write, triggers are generally not able to capture the reads by SQL statements. Although every record that is updated or deleted is also a record that is read, a Delete, Insert, or Update statement can cause more reads especially when they contain nested Select statements, which we will show shortly.
In order to capture reads, we take an approach to extract reads from SQL statement profiles and transaction input arguments. The job of the SQL Statement Logger is to keep every SQL statement as well as its arguments in the SQL Statement Table. To illustrate, Table 1 
Read Extractor
Triggers can capture every write operation, however, no COTS DBMS logs read operations and triggers cannot capture reads. DAIS takes the approach of extracting reads from SQL statement texts. In particular, the Read Extractor uses the SQL Statement Table and Our study has shown that for most real world Select, Insert, and Delete statements that have a simple structure, the above method can work very well. However, it should be noticed that for many complex SQL statements that contain nested Select statements, extracting reads is not a easy job. In [2] , some general guidelines are given for extracting reads from nested statements. Moreover, it should be noticed that the method of extracting reads from transaction profiles sometimes may only restore an approximation of the real read set of a transaction because the complexities of transactions can result in such read set templates that make exact materialization impossible. In order to guarantee that approximate read sets will not affect the correctness of DAIS, we need to enforce the following constraint during the process of extracting read set templates:
Containment Rule: Whenever a read set template is extracted from a transaction profile, any transaction Ì of that type, when executed, must have a real read set contained by the materialized read set template.
SQL Statement Rewriter and Redirector
To save resources, DAIS does not use completely replicated databases to do isolation, instead, DAIS maintains extra data versions only for the items that are updated (including item creation) by an isolated transaction. In particular, when a suspicious user is isolated, for each (real database) Here the Status field of a record indicates the corresponding transaction commits, aborts, or is still active.
The key challenge of DAIS is how to enforce one-way isolation. When an isolated user issues a SQL statement to access a table Ê , according to one-way isolation, a record Ö in Ê can be read only if Ö does not have a version in Ë , and only Ë can be modified. To achieve this, changing the way SQL statements are executed, i.e., using templates, can cause substantial overhead, however, executing the SQL statement solely on Ë can generate invalid results, so the only practical way is to rewrite the SQL statement.
To rewrite and redirect user SQL statements, we have to proxy user transactions. DAIS assumes every Application uses OCI calls, a standard interface for Oracle, to access the database. To proxy user transactions, DAIS proxies every OCI call by providing the Applications with a pseudo OCI interface, which forwards each OCI call to the Mediator instead of the Oracle Server. Note that although currently DAIS only supports the applications that use OCI calls, the Mediator can be extended to support a variety of other Oracle interfaces such as ODBC, JDBC, Pro*C, and SQL*NET.
In Oracle database applications, a user can read a table through four kinds of SQL statements, namely, Select, Insert, Update, or Delete (Note that when a Delete or Insert statement has one or more Select statements nested, it can cause reads), and a user can write a table through the four kinds of SQL statements except Selects. Hence, in order to enforce the Version Control Algorithm, DAIS may need to rewrite and redirect every kind of SQL statements. The SQL statement rewriting and redirecting algorithm is specified as follows. In general, the rewriting algorithm for each kind of SQL statements has three steps: (1) build the virtual database for the isolated user; (2) execute the statement; (3) restore the real database. º delete every record that has been inserted into Ê ½, ..., Ê Ò ; º for the records that have been deleted from Ê ½, ..., Ê Ò , re-insert them into these tables;
else if the SQL statement is a Delete and assume it does not handle any nested tables and its WHERE clause accesses tables Ê ½, ..., Ê Ò º for each Ê that has some records that are deleted from Ë , delete these records from Ê and keeps these records in memory;
º for each Ë that has some records that are not in Ê , insert these records into Ê ; º rewrite the Delete statement in such a way that the key word "DELETE" is replaced with "SELECT *"; º rewrite the Select statement (generated from the previous step) as ( 
Read Edge Manager
The Read Edge Manager (REM) uses the Read Edge Table, whose structure is shown as follows, to keep read edges.
User ID From To
In particular, each record of the table represents a read edge, the From and To fields represent the identifiers of the two transactions that comprise the read edge. The algorithm of the REM is as follows. Here we assume that whenever a suspicious transaction commits, the SRR will send an ISO-TRANS-COMMIT message to the REM. º for each record in the read set:
if the record is in the corresponding suspicious 
Merger
The information kept in the Read Log, the Write Log, the Read Edge Table, and the Isolated Transaction Table is enough for the Merger to perform the Conflict Identification and Resolution Algorithm in almost the same way as we specified in Section 2. In particular, when a suspicious user turns out to be innocent, from the Isolated Transaction Table  we know the history of the user, from the Isolated Transaction Table and the Write Log we know the history of trustworthy transactions, from the Read Log and the Write Log we know the read and write sets of each transaction, from the Read Edge Table we know all the relevant read edges. In addition, to back out a transaction Ì , the Merger will compose a specific Back-Out transaction, which restores every data item Ü updated by Ì to the latest value before Ü was updated, and submit the Back-Out transaction to the Mediator. To forward updates, at the end of a merging, the Merger will compose a specific Update-Forward transaction, which forwards all the remained updates (of the once isolated user) to the real database, and submit the Update-Forward transaction to the Mediator.
One key challenge of the Merger is how to enable multiple users to be simultaneously isolated, and how to handle the impact of one merging on other isolated histories. For this purpose, the Merger does the following things:
For simplicity, the Merger never back out trustworthy transactions when doing a merging. Although in this way more back-out cost could be caused, after each merging we need not to check the impact of a back-out trustworthy transaction on each (still) isolated history and back out each isolated transaction that is affected by the trustworthy transaction, which could cost more.
After a merging, if there are still some users being isolated, the merged history will be maintained so that the next (possible) merging can be done based on the merged history. The merged history can be maintained in the form of a dependency graph [2] .
After a merging, if there is no user being isolated, the maintained merged history will be discarded, and when a new user is later on isolated, the part of the trustworthy history that will participate in each further merging will be respecified, which will only cover the trustworthy transactions that commit after the user is isolated. In this way, the processing load on the Merger for the next merging can be dramatically decreased.
On-the-fly Isolation Controller
Doing a merging can take a while. Disallowing every user transaction to run during a merging could cause serious denial-of-service. However, allowing user transactions to continue being executed without any restriction as the merging is processed can jeopardize the correctness of the merging. To ensure that the correctness of merging will not be jeopardized, the On-the-fly Isolation Controller (OIC) works as follows. Note that the drawback (of the OIC algorithm) is that (1) during a merging, (almost) no new transaction of the once isolated user can be executed, and (2) the locked part of the real database can block the execution of some new user transactions, although many other user transactions that do not access the locked tables can still be executed.
When the Intrusion Detector tells the SRR that an isolated user turns out to be innocent, the SRR sends an INNOCENT message to the OIC.
When the OIC receives an INNOCENT message, the OIC will lock every suspicious table Ë that is created for the user and the corresponding Ê table.
Performance Issues
The merit of DAIS is that it causes no extra delay for trustworthy transactions. Although the Mediator does cause some delay for every transaction, this delay is unavoidable even if we do not do isolation because we still need to mediate (or proxy) transactions for the purpose of damage assessment and repair. The limitation of DAIS is that rewriting SQL statements could make the isolated user suffer some delay, although in most cases this delay can be significantly reduced by concurrent SQL rewriting and redirecting. For example, for a deposit transaction, rewriting of the UPDATE statement could be finished during the period of time when the INSERT statement is executed, thus the delay for the UPDATE statement is reduced to zero (if the UPDATE statement should be executed after the INSERT statement).
DAIS can be further optimized to improve performance in the following ways:
Although extracting reads from transaction profile is efficient, this method can only get an approximate read set in some cases. This could cause many innocent transactions to be mistakenly backed out. To reduce the number of mistakenly backed-out transactions, we can let the Mediator to inform the Read Extractor some results of some SQL statements. Since these results indicate exactly which items are read, they can help the Read Extractor to get more accurate read sets.
Although Algorithm 1 can handle any kind of SQL statements, for the SQL statements that only access the records kept in the real database, the Algorithm can cause too much extra cost. To reduce the extra cost, we could optimize Algorithm 1 as follows: for a suspicious SQL statement, for every table Ê that the statement wants to access, we first check if the intersection of its (intended) reads on Ê and Ë is empty (Note that here the reads can be extracted from SQL statement texts). If the intersection is empty, we can execute the SQL statement directly on Ê without losing the correctness.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the design of DAIS, a practical real-time data attack isolation system for intrusion tolerant commercial database applications. By transparently isolating suspicious transactions, DAIS allows suspicious activities to be kept under surveillance without risking further harm to the system or causing denial-of-service to benign transactions. Built on top of Oracle Server 8.1.6, DAIS uses triggers and transaction profiles to keep track of the data items read and written by transactions, and isolates attacks by rewriting and redirecting user SQL statements. Compared with fishbowling, the extra resources consumed by DAIS are much less. To our best knowledge, DAIS is the first tool which can do real-time cost-effective data attack isolation for commercial database applications. DAIS design is very general. In addition to Oracle, it can be easily adapted to support many other database application platforms such as Microsoft SQL Server, Sybase, and Informix. By designing DAIS the conceptual soundness, the functional capabilities, the feasibility, and the practicality of the general isolation approach can be better validated.
There are some future works for DAIS. First, currently after the DAIS tool is started, there is no other input to DAIS except the set of suspicious users (from the Intrusion Detector) and the trails of transactions. Another module can be added to DAIS to provide more interactions between the SSO and DAIS. One desirable feature of this interface would be the capability of showing the SSO the users that are being isolated and the execution of their transactions. Second, the security of DAIS is not addressed in the prototype design. However, successful attacks on DAIS can cause some benign users to be isolated, can cause some malicious users to stay at large, and can cause incorrect merging, which will jeopardize the consistency of the database. For one example, if the messages from the Intrusion Detector to the SRR can be successfully faked, DAIS can isolated benign users. For another example, if the read set templates are maliciously modified then some cycles in a precedence graph may not be able to be identified, and some transactions that cause inconsistency may be mistakenly merged. Therefore, the security of DAIS is a significant concern.
